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A CONSIDERATION OF WHAT AMOUNTS TO DURESS
PER MINAS AT LAW.
WE need only glance at the head of "duress " in Viner's or
Bacon's Abridgment in order to ascertain how frequently cases
involving this subject, in more ancient times, came up for adjudication.
The plea of duress was formerly one of every-day occurrence.
As times werb more refined, and the influence of law more disseminated, the necessity for the use of this defence became rarer;
not so rare, however, as to make it profitless from a practical or
historical stand-point, to investigate the present state of the law on
the subject.
The old common-law definition is well known. It is stated in
Cruise, "If a man through a reasonable or well founded fear of
death or mayhem or loss of limb is forced to execute a deed, he
may afterwards avoid it. But Lord Coke says it is otherwise
where a deed is executed for fear of battery or burning his house,
or taking away his goods, and the like, for these be may have
satisfaction by recovery of damages:" 4 Cruise Dig. 406; 1
Blacks. Com.
Coke obtained his law from Bracton, who gives as instances of
what amounts to duress produced through fear "periculum mortis
et corporis aruciatum." He also lays down the proposition that
this fear must be "non 8uspico vel cujuslibet vani vel meticulosi
hominis sed talis qui eadere possit in virum constantum :" Bract. 1.
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DURESS PER MINAS.

A principle of natural law such as that which avoids obligations
contracted through fear, never originates in the mere dictum of a
text writer. We find upon further research that Bracton's rule is
an almost literal transcript from the doctrine contained in Dig. 6, 1.
6, quod metus causa, and 0. 13, de transactionibus,which is to the
effect that the duress must be such as to overcome the will of a
courageous person, and that the violence must be of such a character as to put one in fear of losing his life or of suffering great
punishment. The fear should be "metus non vani hominis sed qui
in homine eonstantis8imo cadat :" C. 6, ft. dict. tit. It should also
be of some serious evil, "metus majoris mali."
The Roman law, which paid great regard to the bona fites of a
transaction, did not allow any advantage to be gained by the
wrongdoer. Resort to violence met with the severest condemnation. If restoration was not made by the party who had used
force or duress, the party complaining had against him an action
"in quadrzplum :" Dig. 14, p. 8. The exception or plea of duress,
was one well known; it was termed "guod metus causa." Gaius
states it thus: "Si earn rem a me petas, datur mihi exceptio perguam si metus causa te fecisse vel dolo malo arguero, repelleris:"

Gaius, § 117.
The principle stated in the above citations from the Roman law,
is condensed in the maxim "nihil tam consensui contrariumest
guam vis et metu8:" Dig. 1. 18, tit. 1, 9, § 2. The consent being
a material component of every contract, when the mind was not
free to act, there was no "consen8um ad idem" since "non quia
voluit pactus est sed quia coactus et." Says the prmtor in Leg.
1, if, h.: "I will not confirm that which was done through fear."
The intimidation, however, must have been illegal or unjust,
".contra bonos mores." The definition of the Roman law is an
admirable one; "an agitation of the mind caused by fear of damage
present or prospective :" Dig. 1. 4, tit. 2.
What is very significant in this rule of the old civil law, is this:
the establishment of the test that the fear should be of such an
evil as to overcome the will, "sh ominis constantiasimi," of a man
of very great courage. We not infrequently find just such tests
in the laws of a warlike and stern race, with whom power of endurance is held as a virtue of great magnitude. Too often such laws
throw their mantle around the strong, while they leave those most
helpless and needy outside their pale of their protection. The Roman
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law rule, though in some respects harsh, suited the genius of the
nation.
We have seen how the civil-law rule was incorporated by Bracton
into the body of the common law; this was at a period when lawlessness was more paramount than law; when feudalism with its
knight-errantry dominated the land. Any principle to take root
at such a time necessarily must have been of a harsh and inflexible
nature. When the wager of battle had scarce superseded the use
of the heated plough-share, as a test of innocence, Bracton's rule
was introduced, as to what degree of fear should amount to duress
per minas. It was adapted to the taste and manners of the age.
Even his definition, however, was cut down and abridged, when
the only threats courts took cognisance of were fear of death, mayhem or loss of limb. Intimidation caused through fear of other
damage was not considered sufficient to overcome the equanimity
of the mind. If a man had urged that his will had been overcome
by threats of a different kind from those mentioned, he would have
been answered that he should have defied the threats, suffered the
consequences and then have resorted to the law for satisfaction!
Does not this statement illustrate the impossibility of enumerating
all the cases in which a certain principle should be applied? Definitions in order to be of any great practical value, must be ductile,
not rigqd. The modern civil law recognises this idea and has
accordingly enumerated certain rules on the subject under consideration deserving of great attention. They are not based upon
the assumption of the strength of the human will, but rest wholly
upon a due regard to the necessary elements of every contract.
While the cardinal doctrine of the Roman law is retained, its application is extended and greatly enlarged -and moulded to harmonize with the ideas of a civilized age and the human administration
of justice.
Says Grotius: "The assent is imperfect if produced through
agitation of mind, the effect of violence :" Grotius de Jur. Bell.
1. 2, c. 2, n. 7. Pothier uses the same reasoning: "IIn'y a pas
alors de volontg m~me contrainte:" Poth. Pand. As to the degree of violence sufficient to produce this "agitation of the mind,"
the civil law looks to the sex, age and condition bf the parties.
"We judge of the degree of fear by the quality of the person on
whom it is exercised and by the circumstances which cause it:"
Fieffe-La Croix, Tome 1, 99.
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No explanatidn of the doctrine is clearer than that found in
Domat, whose reasoning is as cogent as his definition is precise.
He says: "It is to be remarked that seeing all persons have not
the same courage to resist violence and threatenings, and that
many are so weak and fearful that they cannot stand out against
the least impression, we ought not to limit the protection of the
laws against threatenings .o as to restrain only such acts as are capable of overcoming persons of the greatest courage and intrepidity.
But it is just, likewise, to protect the weakest and most fearful,
and it is chiefly on their account that the laws punish all acts of
violence and oppression:" Domat, pt. 1, Bk. 1. Tit. 18, sec. 2,
1245 et seq. Ie defines duress to be "all unlawful impressions
which move one against his will, for fear of some great evil, to give
a consent which he would not give if his liberty were free from the
said impression."
Domat's logic totally demolishes the argument that the duress
should be such as to overcome the will of a man of firmness. He
not only demonstrates the injustice but the unreasonableness of
this rule. In substance-he says: "When a man is under an obligation from principles of duty to do or not do a certain thing, it is
no more than just that he should be held to a strict accountalhility,
and, therefore, should not be heard to plead duress as an excuse
for the non-fulfilment of his duty, unless that duress was overpowering and in a measure irresistible. In such a case the law
says to him: 'You should be stout-hearted and firm.' But, on the
other hand, when it is 'a mere question of interest whether a man
should adopt a certain course, and threats are resorted to, his
reason tells him to yield to the threats rather than by resisting
them to subject himself to a greater evil. With him it is a mere
question of policy and utility. The idea never entered into the
mind of Domat as it did into that of Coke that a man should submit to being maltreated rather than comply with threats, and afterwards seek such sa.isfaction as he could obtain out of a suit at
law. There is no need to draw a comparison between the common
sense of the civil-law rule and the doctrine of Coke. Nor need
we dwell longer upon the theory of the civil law than is necessary
to quote another author, who is no less lucid than Domat. IMerlin,
after explaining the law absolving parties from fulfilling a contract entered into through fear, says: "They were not free to act,
since they could only exercise their judgments in determining which
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of two courses they should select. That which impedes the free
exercise of the will and determination is contrary to liberty of
action :" Merlin, Questions de Droit, Tome 4, 409.
The principle thus stated has been ingrafted into the Code NapolMon, art. 1109.
Having examined the various rules of the Roman, common and
modern civil law, we are qualified to come to a conclusion, as to
which of these is best adapted to the administration of justice at
the present day. England, with her reverence of :what is called the
"common law," adheres in a great part to the old rule. In this
country we need not be surprised to find this somewhat shattered.
It received its first blow in the early cases of Sasportasv. Jennings,
1 Bay 470, and Collins v. Wrestbury, 2 Bay 211. In these cases
it has been held that duress'of property was sufficient to avoid a
contract. They were followed up by the case of Porshlayv. Furgeson, 5 Hill 158, where BUoNsoN, J., citing these authorities, says :
"In such a case there is nothing but the form of a contract without the substance. Why should the wrongdoer derive an advantage
from his tortious act ?" Before proceeding farther let us say, thatmany cases are to be found holding that money involuntarily paid
may be recovered back. These rest upon a different ground from
that we are considering. The distinction is stated in Atlee v. Backhouse* 3 Mees. & W. 683, and Oates v. Hudson, 6 Exchequer
346.
A few of tie American courts adhere to the old rule in all its
rigidity. The great majority of them, however, have extended its
operation and some have entirely discarded it. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, in the case of huller v. Miller, say : " We
concur with the counsel for the defendant in error that in civil
cases the rule as to duress per minas has a broader application at
the present day than it formerly had :" 68 Penna. St. 486.
The leaning of this court toward the liberal doctrine is intimated
in Fulton v. Hood; opinion of STRONG, J., 34 Penn. 373.
In New York it has been held that terrifying a woman by threats
to prosecute her husband for alleged embezzlement and thus obtaining from her a transfer of her separate property, was a sufficient
duress to avoid the conveyance: Edie v. Sherman, 26 N. Y. 9.
The Supreme Court of the United States has had under consideration many cases of late years involving the question. The
latest is that of Tie United States v. lluckabee, 16 Wall. 431. In
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this case it is held that trespass to lands or destruction of goods
may constitute duress per minas, and that the reason assigned for
the more stringent rule, that a man should rely upon the law for
redress is not satisfactory, as the law may not affordt him anything
like a sufficient and adequate compensation for the injury. The
court repeats as a rule that the duress must be such as to overcome
the will of a man of " ordivary firmness."
We have already shown how unsatisfactory a test this is and how
little consonant with justice. In the case of Walbridgev. Arnold,
this was apparent. Arnold was a blind man, and bad given a note
under circumstances which he asserted amounted to duress. The
judge charged the jury that in order to constitute a case of duress
per minas, it must have been such as to have overcome the mind
of a man of ordinaryfirmness. Arnold's counsel insisted that he
was not a man of ordinary firmness of mind, and excepted to the
charge. The appellate court in delivering its opinion held, that
if the part of the charge excepted to had been all the charge, it
would have been erroneous, as it was calculated to draw the attention of the jury from Arnold's peculiar e.rcumstances: 21 Conn.
231.
In fact the Supreme Court of the United States has applied the
same reasoning we have used in an analogous case. In the case
of Railroad Co. v. Gladmon, it was said that while in a suit by an
adult against a railroad company for damages he must show that
he used "reasonable care and caution," yet of an infant less discretion is required, and the degree depends upon his age and knowledge. "The caution required is according to the maturity and
capacity of the child, and that is determined in each case by the
circumstances of that case :" 15 Wall. 408.
The test we have spoken of is certainly the most obnoxious
feature of the bld rule. We have endeavored to trace its history,
and to show the influences which established it. We have seen
how it has been superseded by the more equitable rule of the
modern civil law. The question then occurs whether an enlightened jurisprudence, which disfavors all species of oppression and
bad faith, and is ever ready to assist the weak and punish those
who take advantage of their weakness, should retain this rigorous
and unreasonable doctrine, so antagonistic to an enlarged and liberal spirit of justice. Its practical effect is to put in delicto a party
who has chosen the less of two misfortunes, by yielding to menaces,

